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ABASTRACT

Title of Dissertation: Analysis of Methods for Z Company to Deal with Single Hull VLCC

Degree:

Master of Science in International Transport and Logistics

Abstract: Petroleum is one of the most important resources for a country. Since
majority of the oil is transferred by sea then this feature made national owned tanker
fleet is very important to a country for both economic and safety considerations. In
2005, IMO issued the new MARPOL amendments which require all the single hull
tankers must out of market before 2015. Since single hull tankers fleet account for
more than 50 percent of total Chinese national tanker fleet capacity then how to deal
with single hull tanker and quickly replace the loss capacity is a question all Chinese
tanker companies can’t avoid especially in a circumstance that Chinese government
want to enlarge its national fleet capacity.

This dissertation focus on Z Company, one of the biggest and oldest tanker companies
in china which will be influenced by this amendment a lot, to see which methods they
should adopt to minimize the influence in economic aspect.

It consists 5 chapters. Chapter one introduce the object and background of this
dissertation, also it review related research result. Chapter two, three and four are the
main body of this dissertation. Chapter two introduces the new IMO amendments and
the direct result after it works. Chapter three discusses solutions to deal with single
hull tanker and also analyses future market of both tanker market and dry market to
see if those methods are economic. By using the result conducted in chapter three, in
chapter four the author shows the economic result of different methods, in this chapter
it will also give some recommendation to deal with the potential risks. Chapter five
shows the conclusion and suggestion to all the company which interested in the
IV

methods deal with single hull tanker.

KEYWORDS: Single hull tanker, updating, conversion, FPSO, gray model
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of this dissertation
Petroleum, due to its high energy density, easy transportability and relative abundance,
has become the world's most important source of energy since the mid-1950s 1 . The
major oil consumption regions happen to be net importers of oil, so their demand
creates a need to move oil safely and efficient from its various sources (Glen, 2002).
The oil tanker, which emerged as a specialized vessel during the 1940s and 1950s,
was developed to meet that need (ibid). When we look back, we can have a general
view as the international shipping market of tanker is a competitive and fast changing
market, it is an industry which influence by many factors such as worldwide political
environment, economic fluctuation, and new technology development, etc.

Long time ago, lots of environmentalists criticized using tanker to transfer oil for sea
pollution either from accident causes or operation of tanker. Once a tanker has an
accident at sea, it will make a huge disaster to the countries around and high sea. As a
result, MARPOL73/78 convention (the international convention for the prevention of
pollution from sea, 1973 as modified by the protocol 1978) had been issued by IMO
for regulate the condition of tanker in order to minimize pollution of sea, including
dumping, oil and exhaust pollution. The object of this convention is to preserve the
marine environment through the complete elimination of pollution by oil and other
harmful substances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances. 2
The Convention includes regulations aimed at preventing and minimizing pollution
from ships, both accidental pollution and that from routine operations, and until 2007
it includes six technical Annexes. On 2003 December 4th, IMO issued the 2003
amendments, it revised of regulation 13G of annex 1 of MARPOL, restate the

1
2

http://gollum.easycp.de/gollum/gollum.php?a=core&l=en&wl=en&q=#Petroleum_by_country
http://gollum.easycp.de/gollum/gollum.php?a=core&l=en&wl=en&q= MARPOL
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deadline of single hull tanker out of market 3 . This amendment has entry into force in
2005 April.

The development of China’s economy is during a rapid growth period, it require huge
amount of petroleum and other raw materials. Since China is not a country that has lot
of petroleum, the gap of supply and demand of China oil is expanding every year
since 2003. Some economists predicted that China will be the largest oil import
country in the world, and this definitely will enlarge the gap in the near future.
Although China already been a big oil import country, there are still lots of problems
of China oil import system. The biggest one is that the singularity of Chinese oil
import source and that made the majority of oil is transfer by foreign companies, in
some years the ratio of foreign tanker companies transport amount reach even 90% of
Chinese total import oil amount. The dependence level is so high that Chinese
government begins to worry about national security once those foreign companies
stop transfer oil to China. For this reason, Chinese government makes a target as
Chinese owned tankers companies should transport the majority of Chinese import oil.
This is very good news for Chinese tanker companies since is a brilliant develop
opportunity for them to expand their fleet capacity. Currently single hull tanker
capacity occupies more than half of Chinese tanker fleet. As there is a time lag
between order a ship and deliver the ship, those companies have to consider how to
enlarge or at least maintain their fleet capacity in the circumstance that single hull
tankers will force to out of market.

Chinese companies can learn something from those developed countries which have
experience with the strategies of single hull tanker. Usually those countries use three
methods that are update it into double hull tanker, convert it into FPSO or scrap.
Hebei ocean shipping (HOSCO), which is a pioneer among Chinese tanker company,
has try to solve this problem not only follow what had already done (they update a
single hull tanker into double hull tanker) but also use a brilliant idea that converted a
3

http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258
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single hull tanker into a dry bulk vessel. As both convert and update job increase,
some Chinese ship yards especially Shan Haiguan shipyard begin to do this job, and
have successfully updated or converted single hull tanker for both domestic and
foreign companies.

1.2 Literature review
From IMO website we can see that the MARPOL Convention is the main
international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment
by ships from operational or accidental causes. It is a combination of two treaties
adopted in 1973 and 1978 respectively and updated by amendments through the years.
The amendment to MARPOL Annex I brought in a new global timetable for
accelerating the phase-out of single-hull oil tankers that was subsequently revised
again by the 2003 amendments. Under the revised regulation, the Condition
Assessment Scheme (CAS) is to be made applicable to all single-hull tankers of 15
years, or older. This amendment also consider some single hull tanker may not build
longer, it allow individual flag and port accept shipowner continued operation not go
beyond the anniversary of the date of delivery of the ship in 2015 or the date on which
the ship reaches 25 years of age after the date of its delivery, whichever is earlier.

This amendment made a lot of scholars wrote articles about the future of single hull
tanker, but most of them only mentioned about the future impact of demand and
supply of tanker market from both economic side and political side instead of possible
solutions for the companies that have single hull tankers.

Ellison (2006) uses some models to give the conclusion as although the capacity of
the tanker fleet through 2010 can be projected fairly well (given the mandatory
retirement schedule and the newbuilding orderbook), the demand for oil transport is
much more difficult to project. Even so, assuming historic levels of growth in oil
volumes to be transported by tanker, it seems likely that the market for oil transport
3

will remain tight through 2010 – but that a crisis seems unlikely.

Stopford (2007) thinks the amendment allows countries can defer the phase out, so
there is no guarantee that 63m DWT will disappear in 2010. Japan, China and
Singapore, all big traders, have already said they will be flexible. In another article of
Stopford (2008), he thinks the tanker fleet is edging along the path IMO charted for it
and it looks as though by 2010 most single hull tankers will either be in the recycling
yard or maybe having fun terrorizing owners in the dry bulk market.

Waldegrave (2005) who seems support convert single hull tanker mentioned once the
markets stay reasonably good owners will be loathe selling relatively young vessels
for scrap and some owners are already looking for alternative uses for their vessels. In
another article (2004) he mentioned the characteristics of the current market present a
niche opportunity for shipowners, which may lead to more conversions of single-hull
tankers to bulk carriers in the near future. Stopford (2008) also agree this point, he
think on the supply-side, the conversion of single hull tankers into ore carriers and
FPSOs is a significant development. Li Shengjing(2007) think the coming deadline
and the prospective of dry bulk market is the main driving force of single hull tanker
owner to convert single hull tanker into dry bulk carrier.

Waldegrave (2004) said further cut-off dates of 2010 for the remaining single hull
fleet, with 2015 the absolute latest date that non-double hulled tankers will be allowed
to trade. What this means for the tanker fleet is that the make-up and appearance of
the fleet will radically change over the coming years with effects on scrapping in both
the short and the long term. Stopford (2007) mentioned that during 2007 scrap price is
dramatically escalated due to there are not nearly enough ships for demolition to go
round at the moment.

As majority of Chinese tanker fleet are single hull tankers, Chinese scholars also look
at this problem. Some articles mentioned about the possible solution of single hull
4

tanker for those companies, but they are more emphasis on the fact instead of analyze
the profit and loss of the single hull tanker owner. Like Liu Liping(2004) ,Tong
Cuilong(2005) mentioned that HOSCO converted a single hull tanker MV
“INNOVATOR” into dry bulk carrier. Those articles just state a fact of those works
but not how to evaluate those actions.

In this dissertation, the author will use some forecast method to predict the future
situation of dry bulk market, tanker market and demolition market. Some articles like
Armstrong’s (2001) gives one hundred and thirty-nine principles used for summarize
knowledge about forecast. Stopford (2004) regard the models available today are too
sensitive to small changes. He suggests 4 steps for reviewing strategy for shipping:
Step 1: Diagnose the problem today. What exactly is the state of the market? Is it a
bubble, a new paradigm, or just a rather frothy shipping cycle? Step 2: Define what's
causing the problem. What precisely has led to the situation which is so different from
the past and what is happening today that will affect the future? Step 3: Specify what
the consequences of current developments as economic forces work on them over the
next few years. Step 4: Develop an action plan to deal with that.

1.3 The framework and content of this dissertation
The main goal of this dissertation is to use economic model to analyze the possible
solutions that deal with single hull tanker and suggest the possible replacement
solution according to the companies’ ability of financial. Due to the limitation of
information, this dissertation will mainly focus on VLCC type tanker and in this
dissertation the author will take Z Company as typical Chinese petroleum
transportation company example to study, and then deduct the general strategy of this
kind of Chinese companies should take. To achieve this purpose, this dissertation will
first analyze the history records of both dry bulk market and tanker market and then
forecast the future of both markets like freight rate, newbuilding price, and
secondhand price. Second, use economic models to calculate the profit and loss of
5

five strategies of how to deal with single hull VLCC tanker and state the potential
problems by take Z Company as an example. Third, give the author’s
recommendation for Chinese single hull tanker companies.

This dissertation will use some economic principles and several mathematical
forecasting methods/ models. The principle of supply and demand is the foundation
method of forecast both dry bulk market and tanker market. Qualitative and
quantitative analysis have been used on both the supply and demand sides of the
market in order to make a study on the trend of the tanker and dry bulk market. This
dissertation will also apply moving average method, exponentional smoothing method
and gray forecast system when forecast.

1.4 Forecast methods
As the author mentioned above, in this dissertation, the author will use three forecast
methods to predict the future, which is moving average method, gray system theory
and exponentional smoothing method. As moving average method and exponentional
smoothing method is very easy to understand, which standard methods in Excel are.
The author will only introduce the gray system theory method.

Chinese scholar Deng Julong first introduced gray theory in 1983 and then this theory
has been widely used in many areas like transport, economic, engineering, etc. The
main feature of this method is this model can solve problem even under the
circumstance that is discrete data, unclear system and insufficient information. Those
features made this model can deal with the problems that have uncertainly
information, variable input and incomplete data.
Steps of building a gray system model is as follow:

Establish the original data array: X (0) ={x1 (0), x2 (0), …… xn1 (0)}:

6

1. Using the original data to generate the new data by adds each data
i

X (1) ={X1 (1), X2 (1) … Xn1 (1)}, XI (1) = ∑ X j ( 0 )
1

2. Make data matrix X and data vector Y
(1)
⎡ −1 (1)
⎤
)
1⎥
⎢ 2 (x + x
1
2
⎢
⎥
(1)
⎢ −1 (1)
⎥
+x )
(x
1⎥
⎢
X= 2 2
3
⎢
⎥
...
...⎥
⎢
⎢ −1
⎥
⎢ ( x (1) + x (1) ) 1 ⎥
⎢⎣ 2 n −1
⎥⎦
n

Y = [ x (0) , x (0)...x (0) ]T
n
2
3

3. Use least squares method to calculate a and b:
⎛a⎞
B = ⎜ ⎟ = ( X T X ) −1 ( X T Y )
⎝b⎠

4. Make time respond function:
a
a
X i (t ) = ( x1(0) − )e − ai +
b
b

5. Make discrete gray model:
a
a
X i +1(t ) = ( x1(0) − )e − ai +
b
b

According to this function we can get the gray model forecast value, then use the
formula: Xi (0) = Xi (1) + Xi-1(1) to get the aim forecast value.

7

CHAPTER2 REASONS AND IMPACT OF SINGLE HULL
TANKER OUT OF MARKET

2.1 Reasons of single hull tanker have to leave market
Oil pollution of the seas is first recognized as a problem in the first half of the 20th
century and various countries introduced national regulations to control discharges of
oil within their territorial waters. In 1967, the tanker MV ”Torrey Canyon” grounded
while entering the English Channel and spilled her entire cargo of 120,000 tons of
crude oil into the sea. This is the biggest oil pollution accidents ever recorded up to
that time. The incident raised questions about how to prevent oil pollution from ships
and also exposed deficiencies in the existing system for providing compensation
following accidents at sea 4 . Finally, in 1973 IMO had a conference to adopt the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.

Although MARPOL convention has largely improved the environment safety standard,
there are still several disasters happened later. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez hit reef near
Alaska area and dumped 11 millions gallons of crude oil that polluted over 1100 miles
coastline which is the largest oil spill accident happened in American waters. This
made the American government adopted an Oil Pollution ACT next year, which set a
deadline of the phase out of single hull tanker access American coastline. Single hull
tanker is a vessel that oil in the cargo tanks is separated from the seawater only by a
bottom and a side plate. Once this plate is damaged as a result of collision or
stranding, the contents of the cargo tanks risk spilling into the sea and causing serious
pollution. Double hull tank, which surround the cargo tanks with a second internal
plate at a sufficient distance from the external plate, protects cargo tanks against this
kind of damage and thus reduces the risk of pollution 5 . In 1992, IMO amended the

4
5

http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24231.htm
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MARPOL convention to make it mandatory for tankers that is 5,000 DWT or more
ordered after 6th July 1993 to be fitted with double hull, or an alternative design
approved by IMO (Regulation 13F in Annex I of MARPOL 73/78) 6 .

In 1999 December the MV”Erika” sank at the coast of France and leakage more than
10000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil that made Europe commission set a proposal on the
safety of the seaborne oil trade in 2000, the main purpose is to replace single hull
tanker in the near future and require IMO to accelerate the speed of force single hull
tanker out of market. This impetus IMO to tight the safety net, in another word,
accelerate the timetable of phase out of single hull tanker. In 2001, IMO adopted a
revised schedule of single hull tanker, which is the revision of regulation 13G of
MARPOL 73/38.

In 2002 November, another single hull tanker MV “Prestige” sank at the coast of
Spain and leakage 63000 tones oil. After this accident, the Europe commission ban
heavy density single oil tanker and published regulation No.1726/2003 that state a
new requirement of all single hull tankers which want to access Europe commission
member’s ports. This incident also finally leads IMO in 2003 issue a further revision
phase out timetable to the 2001 amendment.

According IMO proposal, the 2003 amendment divide oil tanker into three categories
which are 7 : Category 1: an oil tanker of 20000 tons deadweight or more carrying
crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30000 tons
deadweight or more carrying oil other than the above, which does not comply with the
requirements for new oil tankers as defined in Annex I of MARPOL. Category 2: an
oil tanker of 20000 tons deadweight or more carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel
oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30000 tons deadweight or more carrying oil
other than the above, which complies with the requirements for new oil tankers as
6
7

http://oils.gpa.unep.org/facts/prevent-sea.htm
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24231.htm
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defined in Annex I of MARPOL. Category 3: an oil tanker of 5000 tons deadweight or
more but less than that in categories 1 and 2. The table below shows the year of
retirement of each category of oil tanker.

Table2.1 Timetable of the 2003 amendment
Category of oil tanker

Date of year

Category 1

5 April 2005 for ships delivered on 5 April 1982 or earlier
2005 for ships delivered after 5 April 1982

Category 2 and Category 3

5 April 2005 for ships delivered on 5 April 1977 or earlier
2005 for ships delivered after 5 April 1977 but before 1
January 1978
2006 for ships delivered in 1978 and 1979
2007 for ships delivered in 1980 and 1981
2008 for ships delivered in 1982
2009 for ships delivered in 1983
2010 for ships delivered in 1984 or later

(Source: IMO http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258)

2.2 Impact of tanker market after this proposal
After IMO published 2003 timetable of phase out of single hull tanker, it has hugely
impact the world tanker market. From figure 2.1 we can see that the percentage of
double hull tanker in the total tanker fleet is rapidly increasing every year. In 1996,
double hull tanker only occupy about 20% of total tanker fleet, in 2006, it almost
occupy about 70% of the whole tanker fleet. Figure 2.2 shows development of total
double hull tankers fleet, from this figure we can find out the total fleet capacity has
almost doubled from 2003 to 2008 reach almost 302 million.

10

Figure 2.1 Tanker fleet developments by hull type
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(Data source: Clarkson research)

Figure 2.2 Double hull tanker developments

(Source: Clarkson research)

Normal time difference between the shipowner order a ship and he/she actually get
the ship is 2-3 years depends on different types of vessel, this is why lots of orders
were made in 2006 which means the shipowners can get new tonnages around 2010 to
replace the single hull tankers, from table 2.2 we can clearly notice this situation by
compare the ratio of ordered ship’s deadweight to exit single hull tanker deadweight
11

in the begin and end of 2006.

Table 2.2 Ration of single hull tanker DWT to ordered ship DWT (million DWT)
Begin of 2006

End of 2006

Vessel

Single hull
Order

Single hull

DWT

tanker DWT

type

Order
Ratio

tanker

Ratio

DWT
DWT

VLCC

27.9

47.2

59.1%

46.6

44.2

105.4%

Suezmax

9.5

11.5

82.6%

15.7

10.8

145.4%

Aframax

16.7

17.2

97.1%

23.2

15.5

149.7%

Panamax

8.8

5.9

149.1%

9.1

5.2

175.0%

Handy

22.3

26.4

84.5%

29.5

24.9

118.5%

Total

85.2

108.1

78.8%

124.1

100.1

123.9%

(Data source: Clarkson research)

Tanker time charter rate also reflects this: in 2003 one year time charter rate of double
hull tanker is first time higher than that of single hull tanker among all three types
(VLCC, Suezmax and Aframax) and the gap between those two kinds is became
larger and larger every year. This situation is even more obvious in 3 years time
charter rate which means shipowner/charterer doesn’t has much confident on the
future of single hull tanker. If we look those data in detail, we can get that from 2005
when the new timetable comes into force, the hire difference of all three types is
increasing more quickly especially when market is good in 2008, this situation also
indicate that the charterers has pessimistic attitude to the future of single hull tanker.
And the reason behind this situation is more and more countries had set revised
timetable of phase out of single tanker and most of those new timetables are earlier
than 2010. As the time charter rate indicates the direct result is single hull tanker
owners had or will find it is more and more difficult to find a charterer who wants to
charter a single hull tanker.

12

Table 2.3 One-year Timecharter rates of single hull and double hull tanker
VLCC DH
VLCC SH
Suezmax DH
Suezmax SH
Aframax DH
Aframax SH

2005
58721
47635
43423
35038
35144
27615

2006
58308
48221
43173
32462
33154
23202

2007
55548
42154
44452
29500
33144
22404

2008
67500
45000
42000
29000
33000
22000

18-Apr
70000
48000
42500
28000
31500
20000

(Data source: Clarkson)

2.3 Asia sounded death knell for single hull tankers
Since the IMO amendment allows each country to set timetable of single hull tanker
out of market itself, once the new timetable is no later than 2015. This made some
economists like Martin Stopford (2007) mentioned that some big Asia oil import
countries like China, Japan or Korean may allow single hull tanker access to their
ports until the deadline for economic consideration and that may encourage the
shipowner to hold the vessel in market longer than IMO planed. Nowadays, nearly
96% of single hull VLCCs trade in Asia due to tighter rules in the US and Europe
avoid these tonnages ahead of the IMO phase out in 2010 8 . Fixture data also prove
this: during 2006 and 2007 South Korean and India are the only two countries in the
world which have increased the number of single hull tankers they chartered
especially in VLCC. Take Korean as an example, Koreans businessmen chartered 173
of 628 fixed single hull VLCCs in 2007 which means around 60% of crude oil
transferred to Korean is done by single hull tanker. So we can deem Asia as the last
big market for those single hull tanker owners, once Asia ban single hull tanker, it will
destroy this market.

This day finally came in 2007 December a Chinese single hull tanker MV “Hebei
Spirit” spilled nearly 11000 tonnes which is the worst oil spill accident in Korean
8

http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/12/11/3156309.htm
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history. The disaster made Korean government ban single hull tanker access Korean
ports or enter into its water since 2010, which is 5 years earlier than the Korean
government originally planned. As the author mentioned above, Korean play an
important role in single hull tanker market, this made Korean government banned the
single hull tanker will make the single hull tanker owners loss lots of business. Two
major Korean oil refiners, GS Caltex and SK Energy, already announced they would
phase out the usage of single hull tanker.

Korean government’s acceleration of its timetable of phase out of single hull tanker
may not only impact on the single hull tanker owners’ business in Korean, it may be
just the first domino card. Philippine government already responds on Korean’s
proposal and announced they will also ban single hull tanker from April in 2008, two
years earlier than planned. Other Asia countries such as China, Japan, and Singapore
may also learn from this accident and then ban single hull tanker ahead the timetable
they originally planned. Once all those countries ban single hull tanker access their
ports, it will make the single hull tanker’s time charter rate decrease even more as the
charterer will hardly find any big oil import country which will to allow them access.
Just as EA Gibson said this accident could be a trigger for a major shift in the tanker
industry 9 .

So in this circumstance, it is reasonable to conduct that Chinese government will
follow near countries’ experience then to forbid use single hull tanker than they
planed. This made Chinese tanker companies have to think how to deal with their
tankers in advance.

9

http://www.sustainableshipping.com/news/2008/01/70339?gsid=e7f6226df8a4bc62e639af00e74e91e4&asi=1
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS TO DEAL WITH SINGLE HULL
TANKERS

In chapter 2 the author mentioned that single hull tanker would be forced out of
market in 2010. Although some single hull tankers will run for around 25 years in
2010, the others which build in around 1990 will be scraped before their design age,
and this situation is especially serious in VLCC field (see the figure below). Consider
this and the rule of economic of scale, activity shipping peoples are focus on the
VLCC convention project, and this is the main reason this dissertation only discusses
the VLCC market.

From figure 3.1 we can see that the age profile of VLCC fleet which only 8 of the 162
non-double hull vessels in the current fleet will be over 25 years in 2010, this leaving
154 vessels (41.8m DWT) less than 25 years with the youngest single hull ships just
14 years of age (Waldegrave, 2007). As those vessels will not be fully utilized that
made the shipowners very unwilling to scrap them for financial consideration and
made lots of VLCCs still operating in market.

Figure 3.1 Age profiles of tankers

(Source: Clarkson research services)
15

Although the shipowner can operate their vessels until 2010, wise owners already
began to think about whether there is any possible solution to solve this problem or at
least to minimize their potential lost. Generally speaking, there are five solutions deal
with single hull tanker: first, update single hull tanker into double hull tanker, second,
convert single hull tanker into dry bulk carrier, third, demolish single hull tanker,
fourth, convert it into FPSO and fifth, run single hull tanker only in domestic area. In
the following paragraph we can see the future of each solution.

3.1 To update single hull tanker into double hull tanker
The first strategy those single hull tanker owners may choose is update single hull
tanker into double hull tanker. Tanker pacific company is the first one who uses this
strategy. This company signed contract with Huarun Dadon shipyard for convert a
single hull VLCC M.V. ”Sunrise Jewel “which DWT is 302000T (build in 1992) into
double hull tanker. Due to the confidentiality of business, the exactly cost is not
released, some experts predicted that the total update cost is around 20 million USD
plus freight loss about 6.5 million USD (due to the whole update process is about 6
months, the shipowner have no income from this vessel) 10 . Hebei ocean shipping
company is the first Chinese shipping company that updates a VLCC into double hull.
This company updated a single hull VLCC M.V. ”Hebei Mountain “which is a 301665
DWT (build in 1994) in COSCO Dalian shipping yard. This project taken around 7
months and for the same reason as Tanker pacific the author can only use numbers
from Dalian government which indicated that the total cost is about 25 millions
USD 11 , almost the same as Tanker Pacific’s. The converted vessel is predicted to use
for another 15 years which is similar to the supposed remain years of this single hull
tanker.

10
11

Maritime research newsletter 2006.9 P70
http://2005.dl.gov.cn/gov/news/detail.vm?cid=69&diid=36032
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3.1.1 Risk of updating
Lots of VLCCs still operating in the market illustrate the shipowners are hesitating
about whether they should update their vessels or not. Someone may think safety is
main barrier for them to make the decision, since there are lots of cases to illustrate
the possibility of update single hull tanker into double hull tanker and all those
updated tankers are safely operating until now, also consider plenty of shipyards can
do the update work, then the author believe that technical aspect should not be the
main barrier for the hesitation of those shipowners. So what is the true barrier in front
of those shipowner? The author believes the main risk of update single hull tanker is
whether put so much money is worthy or not, the shipowner doubt whether they can
get their investment back. Shipowners may consider what is going on in the future
tanker market and then do trade off about whether spend around 25 millions USD (it
not only includes the update fee about 20 millions USD but also they must consider
the loss of freight income during the update period about 5-6 months) is a wise
investment. If tanker market is not goes as well as they wish, shipowners have to bear
a great financial burden of pay operating cost and interest day by day especially for
such a huge vessel. This is why the essential driving force is still the future of the
tanker market, whether the freight rate will attractive enough or not. So in the next
paragraph, the author will analyze the demand and supply of tanker market.

3.1.2 Analyses of supply and demand of future tanker market
No matter which business, supply and demand is always the essential factor to decide
the price, the tanker market rate is also following this rule. The supply and demand of
tankers decide the future market rate, once there are too many tankers in the market,
the freight will decrease, and vice versa.

3.1.2.1 Demand side of future tanker market
Tanker demand should be look from two sides, one is the actual volume of oil to be
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transferred, and the other is tonne miles, which used to calculate the actual demand
for tankers.

From table 3.1 we can see that the demand of oil is increasing constantly those years
and those enlarged demand is mainly contribute by non-OECD countries such as
China and India which quickly development during those years. From table 3.2 we
can find that more and more non-OECD countries begin to widen their suppliers
which means those countries will not only fixture loading places around Middle East
Gulf as usual but also South American, West Africa, etc. This situation will make the
demand of tankers increase even if the import oil amount is the same due to the total
tonne miles will increase. Take China as an example, according to Cliff Tyler (2008),
China accounted for 36% of all trade volume growth since 2000 and China import oil
from Atlantic reach 34% in 2007 compare to 18% in 2001. If we can take Venezuela
as a typical oil export country, then we can see how much will increase the demand of
tanker if China imports more from Atlantic area. Nowadays, China oil import amount
from Venezuela is 200000 B/P and America imports 1400000 B/P from Venezuela.
Once China imports more oil from Venezuela, as Venezuela can’t increase their export
capacity immediately, it means once Venezuela decide export more oil to China,
America has to find another oil export country to replace the loss in Venezuela, let’s
assume West Africa. By use some distance calculation software, we can get that from
Venezuela to the Gulf of Mexico the come and back voyages take 15 days (assume
speed is 14.5 knots), it takes 60 days for Venezuela to China, 38 days for West Africa
to Gulf of Mexico. The reason why Venezuela wants to export more oil to China is the
same as China want to find more suppliers, which is lower the dependence of one
country and diversify the risk. If China really imports more from Venezuela, let’s say
5000000 B/P, and using a 75000 DWT vessel to transfer 70000 DWT cargos (assume
7.2 barrel=1 DWT). Transfer those oil needs at least 350 voyages, in another world, it
needs at least 59 vessels (1 vessel can fulfill 6 voyages at most, 360/60 and
350/6=58.3) compare to if those amount of oil transfer to American only needs 15
vessels. The result is both China and American will increase its demand of tankers. As
18

developing countries like China, India or other developing countries already begin to
look for more export oil countries than Middle East, and also some oil export
countries begin to sell oil to more countries, it confidently to say that even the future
oil transport amount doesn’t increase much, it still will increase the demand of
tankers.

Table 3.1 World oil demand (millions barrels per day)
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

OECD Demand

49.4

49.7

49.3

49.2

49.5

Non-OECD

33.1

34.2

35.5

36.8

38.2

82.5

83.9

84.8

86

87.6

1.70%

1.07%

1.42%

1.86%

demand
Total demand
(Source: Oil market repots http://omrpublic.iea.org/balances.asp)

Table 3.2 World oil supply (millions barrels per day)
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

20.9

22.1

22.5

22.7

21.7

52.7

55.2

55.3

55.5

56.5

28.2

28.1

27.9

27.9

26.2

79,7

83.3

85.5

87.2

87.2

4.60%

2.60%

2.00%

0%

OPEC and Non OPEC Middle East
Supply
Non-OPEC and Nom-Gulf OPEC
Supply
By net Importers
Total supply

(Source: IEA Status, Total including NGLs and processing gain)

In table 3.3, the author use moving average method based on the average increasing
rate (OECD demand increase 0.05%/year, Non-OECD demand increase 3.65%/year,
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supply increase 2.3%/year) to predict the future oil supply and demand amount. From
this prediction we can see that the in the future the main demand growth is still
contributed by non-OECD countries and it will almost import as much as OCED
countries’ in 2012.

Table 3.3 Prediction of future supply and demand (millions barrels per day)
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

49.5

49.5

49.6

49.6

49.6

38.2

39.6

41.0

42.5

44.1

Total

87.6

89.1

90.6

92.1

93.7

Future supply

87.2

89.2

91.3

93.4

95.5

OECD Demand
Non-OECD
Demand

As the author mentioned above the total supply can’t increase immediately and once
those Non-OECD counties import more and more oil, no matter the OECD countries
can successfully purchase in other places to replace the loss or not, there will at least
one country has to find a longer distance oil export country. According to this
situation, the author in the future the actual demand of tankers will increase more than
the demand of oil. From table 3.4 we can also find this phenomenon that the actual oil
carrier demand growth rate (average growth rate is 4.5%, for VLCC side is 4.31%) is
larger than the oil demand growth rate (average growth rate is 1.7%). Then by use the
same forecast method we can get the future oil carrier demand and future VLCC
demand in table 3.5.

Table 3.4 Tanker demand (m DWT)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

200,000+
114.6
122
128.2
133
135.6

Change
6.46%
5.08%
3.74%
1.95%
20

Total
249.9
268
282.3
289.2
297.8

Change
7.20%
5.30%
2.40%
3.00%

(Source: Drewry tanker forecaster 07 4Q, p28)

Table 3.5 Tanker demand forecast (m DWT)
VLCC
forecast
Demand
forecast
Drewry
forecast

2008

2009

2010

2011

2021

141.4

147.5

153.9

160.5

167.4

311.2

325.2

339.8

355.1

371.1

310

337.8

348.2

364.5

376.8

3.1.2.2 Supply side of future tanker market
First, in 2010 all single hull tankers will be forced to out of market which means there
is a question of whether there are enough double hull tanker capacity to replace them.
Maritime economists like Martin Stopford (2008) mentioned that the single hull
tanker fleet is still 83.4million DWT and account for 23% of the total fleet in 2008
March and he doubt whether those tankers can out of market in time if the new
capacity can’t fulfill the demand. From Clarkson’s data there are 43.6 million DWT
single hull VLCC still operating in the market up to 2007 and account for 30.3% of
total fleet capacity. As the author mentioned in chapter 2, shipowners had order a lot
of double hull tanker in 2006, from table3.6 we can find that in 2009 there are huge
amount of VLCC will be delivered and the total orderbook is account for 39.9 of
current fleet capacity. If we don’t consider single hull VLCC, this number will around
50%. So there is no problem of replaces the single hull VLCC and possible situation
is oversupply situation will widen in 2009 although if those single hull tankers can out
of market timely the oversupply situation will be effectively soften.

Table 3.6 VLCC fleet profile and order book
2004
130.6

Tanker fleet year end
1-Apr-08
2005
2006
2007
No
m.DWT
137.7
142.3
138.3
499
147.2
Order book and delivery schedule
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No
191

m.DWT
58.8

%Fleet
39.9

2008
9.8

2009
20.4

2010+
28.7
(Data source: Clarkson)

So the question is whether those single hull tanker can timely out of market or the
demolish rate will still so low? From table3.7 we can see that since 2003 demolish
rate is not as high as it should be especially in VLCC field. Compares to table 3.6 we
can see that the remained single hull tanker fleet is 43.6m DWT that is even larger
than the sum of scraped vessel capacity from 2003 to 2007. The main reason of this
situation is the average scrapping age for tanker over 100000 DWT was 28.3 years 12 .
As the author mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that most of those single hull
tankers especially VLCCs are not old enough to make owners willing to scrap it, so
the author really doubt whether those vessels will all be scraped before 2010 or not.
Possible situation is most of them are forced to scrap after 2010 and that will made the
scrap price decrease. One good news is in 2008 update to March, there are already 2
VLCCs be scraped due to the shipowners are afraid this situation maybe true in the
near future. But although there are some demolish work, it still too little to soften the
imbalance of tanker, in another word, the oversupply situation seems will not change
much before 2010.

Table 3.7 Tanker scrap activity (000DWT)
10-50,000 50-80,000 80-120,000 120-200,000 200,000+

Total

2003

1494

1417

2665

1574

10059

17209

2004

947

1026

1952

1425

1340

6690

2005

750

961

1405

544

262

3922

2006

1304

435

909

0

0

2648

2007

1525

320

999

324

0

3168

(Source: Drewry tanker forecast 07 4Q)
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If single hull tankers can’t phase out in time, is there any chance that some double
hull tankers may out of market? We can find the answer from table3.8 that the size
and age of the double hull tanker in 2007 indicates that majority of double hull
tankers are even younger than single hull tankers. Consider this and after 2010 the
new delivery VLCC account for around 50% of total fleet, the result is there is very
unlikely that the tanker demolish market will has a lot of double hull tanker scrap jobs
even around 2012, in another word, in the supply side there only has a very small
chance to reduce a lot at least in 2 years.

Table3.8 Double hull tanker fleet by size & age up to 1st September 2007
Fle e t Nos. and '000 Dwt
Siz e Dwt (tonne20 yrs & ove r 15 - 19 yrs

10 - 14 yrs

5 - 9 yrs

0 - 4 yrs

TO TA L S

Le ss than 10,00

98

443

60

332

164

983

227

1,369

385

2,193

934

10,000 - 14,999

13

148

7

93

56

664

68

833

159

1,978

303

3,715

15,000 - 19,999

8

132

3

51

26

443

79

1,415

130

2,421

246

4,462

20,000 - 24,999

9

205

2

47

4

88

16

360

13

301

44

1,001

25,000 - 29,999

14

393

12

344

8

227

7

183

34

916

75

2,062

30,000 - 34,999

9

285

5

165

17

543

40

1,305

53

1,776

124

4,074

35,000 - 39,999

13

510

8

294

33

1,235

76

2,792

148

5,516

278

10,348

40,000 - 44,999

8

349

21

885

40

1,695

24

1,045

88

3,627

181

7,600

45,000 - 49,999

10

472

22

1,021

42

1,945

98

4,554

253

11,840

425

19,832

50,000 - 59,999

2

106

1

55

2

111

0

0

69

3,549

74

3,821

60,000 - 69,999

12

793

10

677

18

1,191

22

1,489

32

2,147

94

6,297

70,000 - 79,999

3

232

0

0

2

148

16

1,166

147

10,768

168

12,314

80,000 - 89,999

8

670

15

1,264

4

351

9

776

3

255

39

3,316

90,000 - 99,999

1

99

32

3,115

73

7,049

18

1,783

13

1,253

137

13,300

100,000 - 119,99

2

213

7

744

19

2,002

114 12,174

287

31,218

429

46,352

120,000 - 159,99

6

759

21

3,065

42

6,057

86 12,859

101

15,703

256

38,442

160,000 - 199,99

1

191

0

0

0

0

10

1,620

28

4,719

39

6,530

200,000 - 254,99

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

255,000 - 319,9 9

0

0

0

0

134 40,199

148

45,322

0

0

0

0

320,000& Above
TO TA L

217 6,000

226 12,151

58 17,181

3

1,203

608 41,914 1,046 86,807 2,094

0

0

2

884

146,707

5,320

340 102,703
5

2,087

4,191 293,578

(Source: Clarkson research)

3.1.3 Analyses of freight and newbuilding price
After the author analyzed in chapter 3.1.2, we can find that demand of tanker will
increase above 4% and the new capacity will increase 9% every year. It seems the gap
will widen, but always remember there are 29% current fleet is single hull tanker,
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when and how they out of market will decide the future of VLCC. If no less than half
of those single hull tanker can out of market timely, the market will be much better.

3.1.3.1 Future freight rate
From figure 3.2 we can see that the since 2004, the BDTI (Baltic Dirty Tanker Index)
is decreasing constantly; from table 3.9 we can see precise freight rate and hire of
VLCC. In spot charter, the main trend of VLCC is declining. In contrast, time charter
hire’s general trend is climbing. This is very strange that shipowners had different
attitudes towards same market. Martin Stopford’s (2007) explanation is for short run,
the shipowner/charterer consider freight more depends on sentiment, for long run they
decided it more depends on the supply and demand rule. We can see this phenomenal
more clearly by table 3.10. As the author mentioned in chapter 2.3, in 2007 December
there is an oil leak accident happened in Korean, no one know what is the effect of the
accident and this made the spot rate boosted in that month due to charterer didn’t
know what is going on in the future, they may afraid the supply of VLCCs will
sharply dropped by ban single hull VLCCs. As they found the reality was not as bad
as they thought, the market rate sharply decline in January 08. From this, we can say
that the spot market is really an unreasonable index to reflect situation of the market
when compare to period rate. Also consider sentiment is a thing which almost
impossible to be precisely predicted so in this dissertation the author will only
calculate future VLCC tanker freight and invest in those tankers base on time charter
rate.
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Figure 3.2 BDTI from 1998 to 2007

(Source: Clarkson)

Table 3.9 Freight rate change for VLCC

VLCC 5yr
280KDWT

Spot rate
($000)
Change
Period
($000)
Change

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

47

90.1

51.6

46.3

39.5

2008(first
three
months)

124.70% 91.70% -42.70% -10.30% -14.70%
33.6

53.9

60.1

56

53.3

67

42.90%

60.40%

11.50%

-6.80%

-4.80%

25%

(Data Source: Drewry)

Table 3.10 VLCC spot and time charter rate from 07 NOV to 08 FEB
VLCC
(280000DWT)
7-Nov
7-Dec
8-Jan
8-Feb
8-Mar

AG-Japan AG-S.Korea AG-N.Europe
30900
149000
82200
57600
57000

42600
137300
83200
57600
45800

47300
132100
105900
57000
51100

5yr old
(TC1year)
40267
62000
62000
70000
71000

10yr old
(TC1yr)
53000
49500
50000
53000
54000

5yr old
(TC3yr)
48000
50500
50000
53000
53000

(Data Source: Drewry tanker insight)

Using gray forecast GM (1, 1) to predict the time charter rate of a VLCC.

From table 3.10, we can get the original data array:
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X (0) = {33.6, 53.9, 60.1, 56, 53.3, 67}

1. Add each item from X (0) and get the new array
X (1) = (33.6, 87.5, 147.6, 203.6, 256.9, 323.9)

2. Data matrix
⎡ 1 (1)
(1)
⎢ − 2 [ x (1) + x (2)
⎢
⎢ − 1 [ x (1) (2) + x (1) (3)
⎢ 2
⎢ 1
x = ⎢ − [ x(1) (3) + x (1) (4)
⎢ 2
⎢ 1 (1)
⎢ − [ x (4) + x (1) (5)
⎢ 2
⎢ 1 (1)
(1)
⎢ − [ x (5) + x (6)
⎣ 2

⎤
1⎥
⎥
1⎥ ⎡ −60.55
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢ −117.55
1⎥ = ⎢ −175.6
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢ −230.5
1⎥ ⎢ −290.4
⎥ ⎣
⎥
1⎥
⎦

1⎤
1⎥⎥
1⎥
⎥
1⎥
1⎥⎦

Data array:
Y={x (0) (2), x (0) (3), x (0) (4), x (0) (5)} T = {53.9, 60.1, 56, 53.3, 67}

3. Get a and b
⎡a ⎤
T
−1
T
⎢b ⎥ = ( X X ) ( X Y )
⎣ ⎦
⎡
⎡ −60.55
⎢
⎢
⎢⎛ −60.55 −117.55 −175.6 −230.5 −290.4 ⎞ ⎢ −117.55
= ⎢⎜
⎟ ⎢ −175.6
1
1
1
1 ⎠⎢
⎢⎝ 1
⎢
⎢ −230.5
⎢
⎢⎣ −290.4
⎣
⎡
⎛ 53.9 ⎞ ⎤
⎢
⎜
⎟⎥
⎢⎛ −60.55 −117.55 −175.6 −230.5 −290.4 ⎞ ⎜ 60.1 ⎟ ⎥
× ⎢⎜
⎟ ⎜ 56 ⎟ ⎥
1
1
1
1 ⎠⎜
⎢⎝ 1
⎟⎥
⎢
⎜ 53.3 ⎟ ⎥
⎜
⎟
⎢
⎝ 67 ⎠ ⎥⎦
⎣
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1⎤ ⎤
⎥
1⎥⎥ ⎥
1⎥ ⎥
⎥⎥
1⎥ ⎥
1⎥⎦ ⎥⎦

−1

⎡185666.8875 −874.35⎤
=⎢
5 ⎥⎦
⎣ −874.35

−1

⎛ −51891.13 ⎞
⎜
⎟
⎝ 290.3 ⎠
⎡3.05164 E − 05 0.005336397 ⎤ ⎛ −51891.13 ⎞
=⎢
⎟
⎥⎜
⎣ 0.005336397 1.133175689 ⎦ ⎝ 290.3 ⎠
⎛ −0.034373 ⎞
=⎜
⎟
⎝ 52.049275 ⎠

a= -0.034373 b=52.-40275

4. Get gray model:
X (1) (t+1) =(X1 (0)-b/a) e-ai+b/a=
(33.6+1514.26933)*e-0.034373i-1514.26933=1547.86933e-0.034373i+1514.26933

From this equation we can get the predict X (1) and predict Y2 (table 3.14)

Table 3.11 Forecast and actual freight rate ($, 000) of VLCC using gray model
Year
Actual amount

2003
33.6

2004
53.9

2005
60.1

2006
56

2007
53.3

2008
67

X (1)

33.6

87.7

143.75

201.73

261.7

323.85

Y2
Difference

33.6
0

56.68
-0.2

56.1
4

57.9
-1.9

54.1
-0.8

68.04
-1.04

As the difference is very small, so the author use gray model to predicts the future
tanker freight and gets the table below.

Table 3.12 Predict future freight rate ($, 000) of VLCC
Year

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Freight rate

68.04

64.29

66.52

68.86

71.26

3.1.3.2 Future newbuilding and secondhand price

Although the freight rate is very fluctuating and generally didn’t increase too much,
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the newbuilding market and secondhand market of VLCC are still very strong
(newbuilding VLCC price increase from 67.1millions USD to 147 millions USD, 5
years secondhand VLCC price increase from 60.3 millions USD to 136 millions
USD 13 ). So why newbuilding and secondhand vessel price is increasing while the
income of shipowner is decreasing? Some analysts think this is an indicator that
shipowners have faith on the future freight market rate. The author admit this maybe
one reason for why the price increasing those years, but the author thinks there are
also other reasons that made this situation which are first, rising steel price (figure 3.3
shows that the price of steel growing so much especially in Asia, which is the main
shipbuilding area occupy about 88% of global order book 14 ); second, there are not
enough berths in shipyard made the insufficient supply; third, due to the shipyards
have orders stretching to at least 2010 which made them not hurry to lower their price
and happy to wait and see the future market. So it is not wise to just make the
conclusion that booming shipbuilding price and secondhand price is contributed by
the faith in future from charterer.

Figure 3.3 Global and Asia steel price index

(Source: www.crugroup.com)

13
14

Drewry tanker monthly report 2008 4th
World shipyard monitor volume 15 No.2 February 2008 P10
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In 2008 Feb, Asia's three largest steelmakers (Nippon Steel Corp., JFE Holdings Inc.
and POSCO) agreed to pay the world number one iron ore producer Vale 65 percent
more for iron ore compare to 2007 which setting a global benchmark for prices 15 .
Even increasing 65 percent, some experts think this number is under their estimated
number due to the end customers of those iron and ore companies are in shipping or
other industry which still very strong. The negotiation with Australia huge iron and
ore traders Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton is deemed even harder than that with Brazil
and predicted increase more than 80%. The latest news is those two companies
demand a 100 percent price hike, they think they should get a higher price than Vale
for it is cheaper to transfer iron ore from Australia than Brazil. The problem is once
those iron and ore buyers accept the price with Rio Tinto and BHPB, Vale may protest
and want a higher price. Since shipyards already have orders until 2012 that means
they will not hurry to sign new orders if the price is not charming. So consider both
factors, the author think the price of both newbuilding and secondhand VLCC price
will not decrease a lot at least before 2010, especially newbuilding price.

3.2 To convert single hull tanker into dry bulk carrier

Since the tanker freight is flagging and dry cargo market is booming (the difference
between freight of same DWT of dry bulk carrier and tanker is even 50% and that
lead China shipping and COSCO’s revenue from dry bulk market increased at least
30%. Sinotrans, which main business is tanker market, suffer around 1 million RMB)
in 2007 then a hot topic is generated, shipowners begin to think about convert those
single hull tankers into dry bulk carriers.

Hebei shipping is the first company, which tried to convert single hull tanker into dry
bulk carrier in the world. After discussed with many experts and had the permission of
China classification society, in 2004 a VLCC M.V.” Hebei Innovator” which was
originally 250000 DWT single hull tanker had been began to convert by Shan
15

http://www.au.all-biz.info/news/index.php?newsid=147
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Haiguan shipyard, after 8 months working, the ship was successfully converted into a
236697 DWT dry bulk carrier. After passed the inspection from China classification
society, this vessel had already run 10 voyages safely update to 2007 May.

According to Clarkson’s information up to November 2007, there are 114 vessels to
be considered as candidates for conversion projects, including 60 VLCCs for
conversion to VLOCs 16 . TNT, a Taiwan shipowner will convert 7 VLCCs to VLOCs
and that will make this company become one of the biggest bulk carrier operators in
the world. The table below shows the conversion works in 2008, we can see that
during this year the total capacity of conversion VLOC is about 3.7 million DWT
which is even larger than that of current VLOC fleet (2.2 million up date to 2007). So
we can see how much impact the VLCC made or will make to bulk market.

Table 3.13 VLOC bulker under conversion in 2008
Name
New Type DWT GRT Unit CGT
Yard
Current Owner
Hebei Warrior
Ore
243,850 140,850 DWT 40,100 Yiu Lian Dock
HOSCO
Sala
Ore
279,989 153,506 DWT 42,260 Beihai Shipyard
BW Ltd.
Sino Trader
Ore
259,993 147,421 DWT 41,231
Sinokor Mer. Mar.
Zodiac Maritime
Orient Jewel
Ore
275,628 144,567 DWT 40,742
Agy.
COSCO
Stellar Cosmo
Ore
269,581 146,802 DWT 41,125
TMT Co. Ltd.
Zhoushan
Nippon Yusen
Shourong
Ore
255,396 138,197 DWT 39,637
Kaisha
K Cosmos
Ore
254,991 137,746 DWT 39,558 Unknown Yard
Korea Line
Margot N
Ore
277,020 142,488 DWT 40,383
General Ore Corp.
Hebei
COSCO
Ore
285,640 153,347 DWT 42,234
HOSCO
Ambition
Zhoushan
Renata N
Ore
285,933 153,427 DWT 42,247
General Ore Corp.
Sino Carrier
Ore
261,284 146,463 DWT 41,067
Sinokor Mer. Mar.
Rebekka N
Ore
255,346 142,367 DWT 40,362
General Ore Corp.
Pacific Ruby
Ore
260,988 146,455 DWT 41,066 Unknown Yard
Cido Shipping
BW Bureya
Ore
279,986 153,506 DWT 42,260 Beihai Shipyard
BW Ltd.
(Data source: Clarkson)

16

Martin Stopford, The End Approaches? Is it Time To Get Converted?,2007
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3.2.1 Cost of conversion

Convert cost of a VLCC into VLOC include two parts as update VLCC: conversion
fee and freight loss of about 6 to 7 months. First, we look some conversion examples.

The first example is three small Handysize tankers conversion work. According to a
shareholders’ meeting report of Haisheng shipping company, which is a subsidiary
company of China shipping, they bought 3 tankers and will convert them into dry
bulk carriers. They spent 69638133 RMB to buy those vessels and the table below
shows the details about them.

Table 3.14 Detail about Haisheng shipping company’s conversion work
Vessel’s

Vessel type

name
Jian Chi

DWT

Building date

Price (RMB)

31

1977-2-1

23888606

34

1977-1-1

24780994

22.9

1977-1-1

20968533

(000,ton)
Single hull
tanker

Yong Chi

Single hull
tanker

Da Qing 244

Single hull
tanker

(Source: Haisheng shipping company’s shareholder meeting report)

From this table we can find one strange thing which is those vessels are almost will be
required to scrap according to Chinese ministry of communication’s order 8 in 2006
which is the maximum running periods of an vessel is 31 years. According to the
shareholder meeting report of Haisheng, after convert those vessels into dry bulk
carriers, they can still use for another 3 years, this also shows how anxious that
shipowner want to has new bulk capacity. The cost of convert three vessels is about
132500000RMB (Jian chi about 46500000RMB, Yong Chi 46500000RMB and Da
Qing 244 39500000 RMB). Although the total cost is 202140000RMB and those
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vessels can use only for 3 years, Haisheng Company still predicts the rates of return of
this invest is at least 10% which also demonstrates how good the dry bulk market is.

From above examples, we can see the conversion cost of average tonnage is relative
expensive when compares to updating. But is it the true story? From the next example
which shows a VLCC convert into VLOC work we can find that the cost of convert a
VLCC around 280000 DWT is around 20 millions USD which is only about 15%
expensive than the total cost of convert three small vessels and the DWT difference is
about 3 times. This can explain the question in beginning of this paragraph, in another
word, the economic of scale phenomena is very obvious in both types of conversion
works. And this is why there are more VLCCs owners want to convert their vessels
than owners of other types of tanker.

From table 3.15 we can also find that main cost of convert a single hull tanker into dry
bulk carrier is relate to steel which take more than 80% of total cost (though here the
source of this reference could not be revealed due to the confidentiality policy of this
shipowner company concerned). This can also explain why the newbuilding price is
increasing so much as steel price is booming.

Table 3.15 Main cost of convert a VLCC (280kDWT)
Unit
Unit

price

Qty

Total

180

540000

(USD)
1.Dock service
Wharfage

Day

3000

Around
Other services
100000
2.Conversion work
2.1 Working drawing

Lump sum

32

200000

1

200000

2.2 Paint service (sand blasting to
SA 2.0 including painting and
dehumidifier)
Ballast tank and new hold paint

㎡

22.5

200000

4500000
Around

Other paint service
180000
2.3 Structure renew
Steel

Kg

1.73

7800000

13494000
Around

Other services
270000
3.Outfitting
Around
Steel work
100000
4.Hatch cover
Steel

Kg

1.8

650000

1170000

5.Staging for the conversion &

Around

repair

600000

3.2.2 Analysis of the supply and demand of future dry bulk market

As the author mentioned in chapter 3.1.2, the supply and demand of a market will
decide the future of this market, in another word transportation always depends on
trade. Since 2006 lots of economics thought the collapse of this market will come
soon due to the bulk trade is so hot that lots of capital invested into this market. They
thought the oversupply will very widen after so many new capacity will in market, but
due to shipping industry has a time lag feature which means the available fleet
capacity can’t increase immediately, this lead us still can’t say when the turning point
will finally comes.

Since converted VLCC, which we should call VLOC, is mainly used to transfer iron
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ore and coal, so in the next paragraph when the author analyzes the demand side, it
will only focus on those areas.

3.2.2.1 Demand side of future dry bulk market

Table 3.16 shows world demand of dry bulk during recent years, we can find that the
total dry bulk tonne mile grows faster than the total dry bulk trade which means the
distance between the import country and export country is became longer, just the
same as tanker. As the result, the demand of bulk carriers will also grow faster than
the demand of dry bulk trade.

Table 3.16 World dry bulk demand (million tonnes)
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Dry bulk trade (m ton)

2340

2510

2637

2797

2975

% Change

5.5%

7.3%

5.1%

6.1%

6.4%

Dry bulk (tonne mile)

10763

11978

12745

13694

14764

% Change

7.9%

11.3%

6.4%

7.4%

7.8%

(Date source: Drewry)

From table 3.17 we can see that the fastest growth dry bulk is iron and ore, which is
just the most suitable cargo for VLOC to carry and this impetus lot of capital invests
in this area. The main reason for iron ore increase so much is due to China factor.
From Clarkson research data, we can see in 2007 the total dry bulk trade amount
increase 136 million tonnes compare to 2006 and more than 50% percent of this
growth is contributed by China which most of them is iron and ore. Since India limits
its iron and ore export amount and in May they impose 15% more export duty on iron
and ore 17 , China has to go to Australia and Brazil to purchase more to replace it. As
the distance between Australia or Brazil and China is longer than that between India
and China, the direct result is increasing import amount from those two countries lead
17

Interocean iron and ore report May 2008
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the demand of bulk carriers increasing. Some economists predicted that once China
imports 50000000 tons more iron and ore, it will need another 30 to 40 Capesize bulk
carriers, the more iron and ore import from Brazil, the more vessels China needs. Also
consider the rule of economic of scale is very clear in shipping which means using
VLOC to transfer that bulk is cheaper than using Capesize when we look at freight
per ton.

Table 3.17 World dry bulk seaborne trade (million tonnes)
2003
2004
% Change
2005
% Change
2006
% Change
2007
% Change

Iron ore
580.4
643.9
10.9%
715.4
11.1%
758.7
6.1%
811.8
7.0%

Coal
619
650
5.0%
675
3.8%
709.4
5.1%
769
8.4%

Grain
211.1
207.9
-1.5%
211.9
1.9%
221.1
4.3%
227.8
3.0%

Minor bulk
957.5
1024.2
7.0%
1049.7
2.5%
1101.8
5.0%
1155.4
4.9%

Total trade
2368
2526
6.7%
2652
5.0%
2791
5.2%
2964
6.2%

(Date source: Drewry)

Another impetus of booming dry bulk demand is due to India government wants to
expand its domestic steel industry that means huge amount of coal is needed.
Previously China was the third largest coal export country to India, but since China
limit its coal export amount since 2006 due to insufficient electronic supply, India has
to import more coal from Australia, Indonesia or Canada which means longer distance
and more bulk carriers are needed. Also consider the electronic fees in China is so
cheap that lead some power station can not gain the profit, once those power stations
decide to increase the electronic fees it will lead some users have to take coal instead
of electronic and that will also impetus the demand of coal.

From above analysis we can see that China and India who want to develop its steel
industry limit its own raw material export amount and this is really good news for
shipping, which means both countries have to find other suppliers to replace the
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missing amount from each other, and usually it takes longer distance to fulfill the
short-hull shipping. So the author think even the total seaborne trade amount doesn’t
increasing a lot, the total demand of dry bulk VLOCs will still increase. Since iron
and ore’s base number is very large, the changed percentage will decrease when
keeping the same amount of cargo. Also consider every country must have its
limitation, the weakening appetite of iron and ore from China and India means the
growth rate will decrease especially China due to the construction work of Olympics
almost finished. So the author believe the increasing pace will slower than the last 5
years (8.8%) and little bit higher than the last 20 years increasing percentage (3.9%).
And the last 5 years and 20 years average increasing percentage is 5.6% and 4.6%
respectively. Also consider the average increase percentage ratio between tonne mile
and cargo tonne is 1.33 and the average increase percentage ratio between tonne mile
and fleet is 1.12, so the author deduct the average fleet demand percentage increase
should be around 6%. But as the author mentioned above, the negotiation with the
world’s number two and three iron ore supplier Rio Tinto and BHPB is still going,
once those two companies can’t make deal with main Asia buyers like POSCO,
Baosteel, Nippon Steel, no one know whether dry bulk market especially VLOC
sector can keep increasing 6% per year.

3.2.2.2 Supply side of future dry bulk market

Table 3.18 show the supply and demand of bulk carriers especially VLOC type bulker,
from this table we can find that the imbalance between supply and demand of both the
total dry bulk carrier and VLOC sector are became narrow from 2003 to 2006 and the
gap is a little bit widen in 2007. Consider around 29% of the total dry bulk fleet is
older than 20 years, it seems the future of dry bulk market will be even better due to
this will lead the shrink the supply side of bulk carrier in the first sight.
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Table 3.18 Supply and demand of VLOCC bulk carrier (mDWT)
Demand tonne
miles (billion)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

160
176
195
205
219
462
485
754
773
1062

Demand
deadweight
(million)
9.7
11.9
13.5
15.6
20.5
24.7
32.4
35.1
39.7
47.2

Supply

Total

Imbalance

11
13.6
15.5
17.3
22
27.7
38.3
44.1
52.3
66.2

313/262.4
325.5/276.3
345.7/299.5
368.1/327.2
391.7/360.2
416.7/370.2
456.7/395.4
518.4/441.4
578.3/471.2
621.1/497.1

50.5
47.1
46.2
40.9
31.5
46.5
61.3
77
107
123.9

(Source: Drewry)

But there are two things should be noticed, the first one is as dry bulk market is so
strong that owner reluctant to scrap their vessels and want to put them in the market as
long as possible, the author known even some 37 years vessels still running between
Malaysia and China transfer coal, this made the demolition rate extremely low those
years that since 2004 the demolition rate never higher than 1%(figure 3.4). The
second thing should be noticed is new bulker capacity account around 60% of the
current total fleet capacity and this number is about 129% in VLOC sector, also
consider the huge amount of conversion VLCC maybe put in market around 2009, it
clearly indicates that the future total bulk carrier capacity will increase more than the
scrap volume. As the author mentioned the increasing percentage of demand side
should be around 6% and the supply side will sharply increasing in 2009 and then still
keep increasing at least 10% in the next 3 years, and regard the overage vessels
doesn’t out of market in time, it is clearly that the gap between supply and demand
will widen again significantly in the coming years and has great impact on the dry
bulk freight if those predicted tonnage hit the water on time.
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Figure 3.4 Demolish rate of bulk carrier from 1990 to 2007

(Source: Clarkson research)

3.2.3 Analysis of freight and newbuilding price of future dry bulk market

2007 was a phenomena year in dry bulk market history, in this year the market reach
extraordinary high level, BDI (Baltic Dry Index) started at 4451 points and reached
the history peak at 11039 point. Since the author mentioned in table 3.18, there are
still 31.5 million DWT differences which are even a little bitter more than 2006, why
dry bulk market boost up so much when actually the supply is increase? The author
think there are two reasons for this: First, as the author mentioned above China and
India limit its raw material export amount and this made the total needs of dry bulk
carrier increase, in some extend this made the actual supply is not as enough as 2006.
Second, a high level of port congestion situation made the vessel take more time than
it should be to finish a voyage, for example, the highest average waiting time of
Australia Newcastle port (a main export port of Australia) in 2007 is 26 days and once
there are 82 vessels congested in this port, this has been predict to impact at least 14%
of world dry bulk fleet capacity. Consider the huge amount of new dry bulk capacity
in market and lots of port authorities decide to enlarge their ports, those two problems
will not impact dry bulk market so much.
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3.2.3.1 Future of dry bulk rate

From table 3.19 we can see that the freight rate in 2007 almost increase 2.5 times
compare to 2006 and as the author mentioned in chapter 3.2.2.2 the oversupply
situation will be widen in the future, the author think it is reasonable to predict the
future freight rate will decrease especially after the mid of 2009 when huge amount of
new vessels will put in market. As Mr. Yang (2007) said nowadays more than two
thirds of total charterparties are time charters or time charter trip. This opinion also
been proved by the author’s working experience that the owner extremely doesn’t like
voyage charter in a hot market. The reasons are first in the booming market delay
even one day is a huge loss for owner and if owner can’t start the laytime clock,
second owner prefer to use time charter or time charter trip for they can gain a long
time stable income in a high lever. So in next paragraphs the author will only predict
the future of dry bulk market based on period rate.

Table 3.19 Freight rate of Capesize from 2003 to 2007
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

40670

69100

50430

45080

116210

30020

55920

49950

45645

102880

Average trip
VLOC

rate
Period

(Source: Drewry)

After the author used some forecast methods like moving average, regression,
exponent smoothing, and gray model, none of them exactly or even closely predicted
the freight rate in 2007. The main reason is the increasing in 2007 is too unexpected
even we can say it is growth unreasonable which much higher than most shipping
businessman’s expectation. As this dissertation is not focus on the prediction of future
freight, the author will use the Drewry’s prediction of future freight rate for reference.
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Table 3.20 Drewry’s prediction of future freight
2008
Average trip rate 104750

2009

2010

2011

2012

66200

59390

44540

39590

91880

77000

70000

60000

VLOC
Period

136460

(Source: Drewry dry bulk forecast 08.1q)

From Drewry’s report we can see that both trip rate and period rate will decrease a lot
since 2009, just as Mr. Rikard Vabo analyst of Fearnley Fonds in a recent Reuters
report said that "Rising bulk ocean freight rates may continue throughout 2008, but
the massive order book will probably facilitate a fall in rates sometime in 2009 or
early 2010, and we do not believe cancellations and delays could save the dry bulk
market from 2010.” 18

3.2.3.2 Future of newbuilding and secondhand vessel price

From the table below, we can see that both the newbuilding vessel price and
secondhand one price are increasing since 2003. After 2005 secondhand ship price is
even expensive than newbuilding one shows the shipowner didn’t want to wait for the
time lag of building a vessel. Although in 2008 there are some signals indicate the
market has high possibility going down after 2008, the price of secondhand vessel is
still increasing while newbuilding price is very slightly down. The author think for
secondhand vessel, as the freight market is still hot which means income is much
more than daily cost then the owner still wants to take advantage of this situation
immediately since maybe they can sign a long period contract in a booming market
and then gain a over average profit in the next few years; for newbuilding market, the
shipowner also doubt the future of dry bulk and this made the price is decreasing, but
due to increasing steel price and shipyards have orders until 2012 that make the
decrease margin is not so much. This can also be proved from Drewry market report
(2008 April) which indicated that the newbuilding activity already slowdown and in
18

Interocean iron and ore report May 2008
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secondhand market a vessel even as old as 30 years can still exchange several hands.

Table 3.21 Newbuilding and secondhand vessel price since 2003 to 2008 Feb
2002
Newbuilding price
36.3
Secondhand 5yr old 24.4
Secondhand 10yr
20.5
old

2003
48
37

2004
64
54.3

2005
59
47.9

2006
68
68.1

2007
97
126.2

2008(Apr)
95.5
131.3

32

46

38

62

105

110

(Source: Clarkson)

So it is reasonable believe that in the near future the margin between newbuilding dry
bulk carrier and second hand dry bulk carrier will increase until the market reaches
turning point that shipowners think they can’t get their investment back. Then the
secondhand price will decrease sharply while newbuilding price will not change much
until 2011, this means buy a secondhand dry bulk carrier before the turning point will
made the buyer face great challenge.

3.3 Other methods

First of all, the chance of use the other three methods is relative low compare to the
above two for many reasons. In this chapter, the author only gives a brief introduction
of those three methods and discusses more about the possibility and current citation of
using those methods in China in the next chapter

3.3.1 Demolition

Clarkson research’s information shows that ships broken tonnage is 10.6 m DWT in
2004, 5.7 m DWT and 6.6 m DWT in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Compare to the
fleet capacity of each year, the percentage of scrap rate is just 0.6% percent in 2005,
which is the lowest rate in history. Usually a ship can be operate for 25 to 30 years
then average scrap rate should be about 3.3% to 4% of total fleet capacity each year
which is much higher than the scraped rate since 2004. After look the whole picture,
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we can also find this by looking the analyze in chapter 3.1 and 3.2 which shows
demolition rates of both tanker and dry bulk carrier are lower than average
demolished rate in the last 20 years. The main reasons are both the freight market is
very strong and most of single hull tanker is very young that owner reluctant to scrap.

From the table below, we can see that the scrap price of both tanker and dry bulk
carrier is constantly increasing through those years and generally scrap price of tanker
is higher than bulk carrier. High rate of scrap price is mainly due to low scrap rate of
both tanker and dry bulk carrier, which means insufficient supply.

Table 3.22 Scrap price ($/ldt)
Tanker
Dry cargo

2005
305
330

2006
410
390

2007
510
470

2008(Apr)
670
630
(Date source: Clarkson)

TMT CO. Ltd scraped a 239351 DWT VLCC M.V “B Elephant” which is 31446 ldt
in 2008 and received 22.48 millions USD. Although owner can receive around 20
millions USD for scrap a VLCC which seems owner can gain a big money, when we
look at the booming secondhand vessel price, it is easy to understand why the scrap
rate is so low. Table 3.23 clearly indicate that 5 years and 10 years VLCC is even
expensive than newbuilding one and once the vessel reach 15 years, its price is only
about 30% of a 5 years VLCC but still higher than demolish price.

Table 3.23 Secondhand vessel price of tanker
2008 Apr $ M
145
125
43

VLCC 5yrs
VLCC 10yrs
VLCC 15yrs

(Data source: Clarkson)

Due to this situation, the author believes that scrapping is the last resort for a tanker
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owner, they adopt this method only when the vessel they own is older than 20 years,
and the author believe reasonable shipowner will not scrap a vessel younger than 15
years right now for sales and purchase market still offering an option to those old
ships.

3.3.2 FPSO

FPSO is the oil gas treatment, oil storage and oil discharge, power generation, control
and accommodation. It is the key facility for offshore oil development, and both
technology-intensive and capital intensive (Fan MO, 2008). Every year there are
about 6 new FPSOs run into the market, those FPSOs are either converted from
tankers or newbuilding. Most of those converted FPSOs were done in Singapore.
China, Korea and Japan also begin to join this market. In 1994, the ratio between
newbuilding and converted is 1:3, in 2005 the ratio change to 46:54. From this we can
find that the future of new FPSO market is shipowner prefer newbuilding FPSO for
those new building FPSOs can work in a worse environment and deeper sea compare
to converted FPSO. But due to the single hull tanker out of market, in 2007 and 2008
there are some FPSO conversion works happened. One thing should be noted is in
FPSO conversion field, we can’t see Chinese owner actively involved in like other
shipping sectors.

Table 3.24 FPSO under conversion in 2007 and 2008
Name

DWT GRT Size Unit CGT
Yard
310,99 150,76 368,89
74,6 Keppel
FPSO Saxi
1
2
7 cu.m 96
FELS
FPSO Cidade de 258,03 143,16 298,84
72,3 Unknown
Niteroi
4
6
9 cu.m 40
Yard
259,99 142,64 295,96
72,1 Keppel
Azurite FPDSO
9
7
6 cu.m 77
FELS
FPSO Cidade de Sao 276,73 142,48 292,15
72,1 Keppel
Mateus
5
8
5 cu.m 27
FELS
308,49 159,18 334,84
77,2 Keppel
FPSO Vincent
1
7
9 cu.m 57
FELS
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Current Owner
SBM Production
Cont.
Modec Inc.
Prosafe
Production
Prosafe
Production
A.P. Moller

268,86 130,89 325,56
FPSO Espirito Santo
5
4
5 cu.m
322,44 152,37 367,89
Petrobras 53
6
4
2 cu.m
FPSO Cidade de 274,16 131,30 338,16
Vitoria
5
3
0 cu.m
274,16 131,30 331,09
FPSO Gimboa
5
3
3 cu.m
273,88 125,46 330,89
Frade
7
5
6 cu.m
273,41 132,20 323,24
FPSO Mondo
0
6
9 cu.m
272,63 135,29 329,93
Petrobras 54
1
2
0 cu.m
273,40 132,20 323,24
FPSO Kikeh
9
6
8 cu.m

68,4
30
75,1
90
68,5
63
68,5
63
66,6
56
68,8
55
69,8
47
68,8
55

Keppel
FELS
Unknown
Yard
Dubai
Drydocks
Dubai
Drydocks
Dubai
Drydocks
Unknown
Yard

SBM Production
Cont.

ENI S.p.A.
SBM Production
Cont.
Single Buoy
Moorings

Jurong S.Y.
Keppel
FELS

Petrobras
Single Buoy
Moorings

Petrobras
ENI S.p.A.

(Data source: Clarkson)

Although there are more than 10 single hull VLCCs under conversion, we still can’t
deem every VLCC can convert into FPSO. Whether a single hull tanker can be
convert into FPSO depend on its strength of structure, fatigue life and corrosion
resistance. Since double hull tankers are not suitable to convert into FPSO (complex
structure and twice time compare to convert a single hull tanker) and single hull
tankers has above constrains, there are not that many vessels can be converted into
FPSO. Consider there are not so many supplies and high technology requirement of
converted a FPSO, few shipyards can and willing to do this job. So the cost of convert
a single hull tanker into FPSO will be very high, BW Offshore’s recent conversion of
the VLCC MV”BW ENTERPRISE” into an FPSO cost a whopping $91.7m
(Waldegrave, 2007), this is really a huge amount of initial input when consider both
the conversion cost and VLCC cost. But consider a newbuilding FPSO cost about 200
to 400 millions USD, there are still many shipowners willing to consider single hull
VLCC into FPSO.

A potential risk is although currently there is no international rule of whether FPSO
should be single hull or double, and the normal situation is all converted FPSOs are
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single hull and newbuilding FPSOs are double hull or double hull board side structure,
no one know whether in the near future IMO will issue a conversion to prevent single
hull FPSO for environment consideration or not. If there will be such a rule, it will
made the huge conversion investment into nothing.

3.3.3 Operate in domestic area

As MARPOL only deal with international shipping problem, once vessels can’t run in
worldwide, the owner can still operate the vessel in domestic area if the country they
belong to doesn’t prohibit it. The advantage of this method is the owner doesn’t need
to invest additional capital and still can gain profit. The disadvantage of this method is
more and more countries have or will prohibit those single hull tanker operate both in
international or domestic business. This means once the country shipowners belong to
prohibit operating single hull tanker in domestic area, they still have to think about
how to deal with those vessels and maybe at that time the shipowner will miss the best
time to sell the vessel. Also as the inland water is not as deep as high seas in most
countries, most big vessels can’t run in inland water, so even the owner want to
choose this way, they can only operate small vessels. So the author believes most
VLCC owner will not adopt this method.
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CHAPTER4 COMPARE THE FOUR METHODS FOR Z
COMPANY

4.1 Brief introduction of Z Company

Z Company is not only one of the oldest shipping companies in China, but also it is
the first Chinese company that owns a VLCC type tanker. According to Chinese
national statistic bureau’s statistic, Z Company’s tankers capacity account for 44.1%
of the whole national large tankers fleet capacity. Z Company not only has business in
tanker market but also operates their owned or chartered dry bulk carriers, which most
of them are handymax type. Currently, it has 14 tankers which are almost 5 millions
tons deadweight (8 VLCC, 1 Suezmax and 7 Aframax) and 14 dry bulk carriers which
are almost 0.7 millions tons deadweight (12 Handymax and 2 Panamax). In 2006,
income from tanker and day bulk market account 63% and 30% of the total income of
Z Company respectively.

The main threat Z Company faces now is more than half of their tanker fleet is single
hull tankers and then consider VLCC fleet account of more than half of its total fleet
capacity, how to properly handle and cover the deficit capacity of those single hull
VLCCs is an unavoidable question they have to deal. According to the author’s
analyze in chapter 3, the most popular methods are convert single hull tanker into dry
bulk carrier and update single hull tanker into double hull tanker. Up to now, Z
Company had already updated one single hull tanker into double hull tanker, which is
a 281598 deadweight VLCC. How to deal the other VLCCs is still un clear especially
consider bulk market is significantly strong.

Since China is one of the fastest economic growing countries in the world which
means China needs huge amount of both dry bulk and oil, definitely national owned
companies will have advantage when negotiate with Chinese businessman compare to
46

other international shipping companies. Since those two opportunities both seem very
attractive, how to choose is very important to them and may decide the future of Z
Company.

4.2 Development opportunity

Due to the majority of China import oil is transferred by foreign carriers. For national
security consideration, Chinese government decided to encourage Chinese tanker
companies increasing their tanker fleet capacity and made them to transfer the
majority of import oil. According to China national development center’s report,
China will import 250 million tons of oil, which will be the largest oil import country
in 2015. Base on above two points, Chinese government already issued a proposal
that stipulate national fleet at least should transfer 50% of China import oil and then
gradually increase this rate to 80% until 2015. If all those oil transfer by VLCCs and
assume a VLCC can finish 8 voyages per year (average Brazil to China round voyage
takes 70 days and average Australia to China round voyage takes 30 days), and then
Chinese tanker operators need double their current fleet capacity then can reach the
object Chinese government set, in another word, they have to increase at least 16% of
its fleet every year. This policy actually made a barrier to those foreign tanker
companies who already have lot of oil business in China for they have to loss their
business chance in China. The direct result is Chinese tanker owners will have more
bargain power when negotiate freight with Chinese oil companies or Chinese traders.
Also consider Chinese government may give financial help to national tanker
companies who enlarge their fleet, then this made nowadays is a great opportunity for
Chinese tanker operators to enlarge their fleet. Some Chinese shipping companies like
Changhang shipping has already set a timetable to enlarge its fleet capacity from the
original 1740000 DWT (up to 2007) to 6580000 DWT in 2010.

China not only import more oil those years but also goes longer distance to import oil
than before. From the figure below, we can find that the percentage of China oil trade
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being transported longer distance has increased from 80% to almost 92%, also we can
notice that the long haul imports business was sourced not only Middle East but also
Atlantic and the trend is China begin to import more and more oil from Atlantic area.
As the author mentioned an example in chapter 3.1, once China decide to import more
oil from Venezuela, increasing rate of tanker demand will higher than that of oil itself.
So in this situation, the author believes that the future of Chinese tanker company is
quite good. Consider Chinese government will not allow those companies to enlarge
their fleet forever, so the more time they consider the more chance the loss the
opportunity.

Figure 4.1 China’s oil import distance

(Source: Clarkson)

Although there is such an attractive policy for Chinese tanker operators, it still hard to
say the future of tanker market is better than the future of dry bulk market for Chinese
shipowner, as China play a more and more important role in dry bulk business
particularly in iron and ore sector. According to Drewry report, China accounted for
49% of seaborne iron ore imports business in 2007, compare with just 16% in 2000
and expected share around 55% by the end of 2012. While doing this dissertation, the
author also does an internship in a Hong Kong chartering company as a broker.
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Working experience told me that more than 60% of our chartering business related to
iron and ore and among those iron and ore business more than 70% related to China,
in either shipowner or charterer aspects. A lot of Chinese cargo owners try to find a
vessel to transfer their cargo particularly if they signed a COA contract and remember
that China not only import iron and ore but also export steel product which means
once China import iron and ore it contribute twice to shipping industry. Although
there is no document statement that majority dry cargo import to China should
transfer by national fleet like tanker, as the unique Chinese political system and
famous face problem, lots of national owned companies still like use national fleet
like COSCO or China shipping. Take COSCO and China Shipping as example, the
dry bulk income has occupy more than 70% of COSCO total profit in 2007 and
increase 34% compare to its 2006 income in 2006,China shipping also increase 72%
of its dry bulk income in such a good market.

4.3 Potential risks of those methods.

It seems both methods will bring the owner lots of fortune, but there are still some
risks they have to consider before they decide to update or convert their VLCC.

The first one owners must consider is shipping market has its own cycle, it cannot
keep growing forever and currently the market is properly already reached its climax.
Although lots experts have predicted that shipping market will collapse during those
years many times and the fact is shipping market at such a prospective period, we still
know the market will fall down one day. The question is only about when and this is
why we need forecasting.

But we should always remember forecast of shipping is a very inexact science, it is so
fluctuate, emotion, and different people have different reaction that lead the result is
not so reliable. The main reason is prediction not just depend on the number, like in
2007 as the gap between supply and demand became smaller, no one even dream the
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freight rate can up to this extend. This feature made the prediction act as a reference,
and the real strategy a company takes is depending on opinion of the leaders in that
company, what they think about the future market. For example, Frontline, which is
the top tanker company, bought several vessels when lots of people predicted the
market would keep going down. P&O is another situation, its chairman decided to sell
the company when they just made a big profit, for they thought the future of container
market can not that good. So after all which strategy to be chosen is depending on
whether the broad’s attitude is optimistic or pessimistic about the market.

From table 4.1 we can see that the require rate of operate a dry bulk vessel and oil
tanker for 10% IRR in 2007 increase at least 30% and 10% respectively compare to
2006 that shows how prosperity the shipping markets are in 2007. In dry bulk market,
operating a newbuilding vessel has lower require rate than operating a secondhand
vessel shows the secondhand vessel is much expensive than newbuilding one when
consider the older the vessel the less the freight rate. This also reflects the market is so
hot that everyone wants to operate a vessel immediately instead of take a vessel one
or two years later. Tanker market is another story, as after 2010 the market is predicted
to be better than currently and that made capital invests in secondhand tanker is not as
much as that put in newbuilding market. Consider 2007 is a phenomenal year in dry
bulk history that made the last 5 years average freight of bulker is higher than tanker,
and as the market finally will back to its track the author think consider 2002 to 2006
years average freight rate is more reasonable. Due to require rate for 10% IRR of both
markets in 2007 is higher than the average rate of those two markets from 2002 to
2006 which may be an indicator that shows shipping market already reached its peak
in this cycle. So investors have to consider do they have ability to bear the risk of
can’t get 10% IRR from this investment and the opportunity cost? Also as invest in
shipping now needs a lot of money, either the money comes from bank or their own, it
is a huge burden once they can’t quickly get the revenue they want especially if they
have to pay huge interest.
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Table 4.1 Compare dry bulk and tanker rate for 10% IRR in 2006 and 2007
2006
VLCC
VLOC
Newbuilding 55750
30750
Secondhand 47200
31100
02-06 average 45411
38950

2007
VLCC
VLOC
63500
41150
51500
49800
03-07 average

2008.Apr
VLCC
VLOC
64700
44000
54500
53000
51380
61760

NB: Delivery in 24 months, 25 year trading life. Prompt delivery five year-old, 20
year trading life. 10% IRR-basis 100% equity, 2007 operating cost, zero residual
value, 360 trading days.
(Source: Drewry)

The possible solution for Z Company is using FFA (Forward Freight Agreements)
which is a derivative product of shipping industry to hedge freight risk. Although,
nowadays dry bulk business account for majority of FFA trade, as operating pattern
and marketing structure is very similar between dry bulk and tanker, it is very likely
that once the tanker market booming as dry bulk market nowadays, there will be lots
of tanker FFA business. The principal of using FFA is two parties have an agreement
to buy/sell a standard quantity of a specified good for delivery at a fixture future date
at a price agreed today (Shuo Ma, 2007). For those companies who have interest
relate to shipping can use FFA to manage their cash flow in advance, then avoid the
risk of marking is changing beyond their expectation. Take dry bulk market as an
example, BDI reached its history peak 11000 points in 2007, and then sharply
decrease in January of 2008 to 5615 points, one month later it back to 8415 points and
it already near the history peak point in April. From this we can see that if charterer
chartered a ship in 2007 or owner charter a ship in January 2008, they will lose huge
amount of money. But if they use FFA properly, they can partly avoid the vibration of
freight market and effectively minimize the risks by take future market profit to
compensate the spot market loss. Of course, FFA is not panacea to avoid the vibration
risk, it only works when rightly handle, one Chinese shipping company misuse FFA
and loss millions USD is a typical example. Due to currently not many Chinese
shipowners involve in FFA, once Z company decide to use FFA method, they have to
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try to hire some specialist as FFA is a two side sword.

The second risk is safety of the vessel. Just as Drewry 19 mentioned Due to the fact
that the design pattern for tankers and bulk carriers are fundamentally different, the
former being strengthened lengthwise whereas the latter are strengthened crosswise
which means its hull strength when loading cargo is totally different. In addition to
this, vessel draught is also turning out to be a problem aspect that the draught of a
converted tanker often is too big to compete with smaller vessels like Panamax and
too small to compete with normal Capesize carriers. The same worry comes from
general maritime corp.’s chairman and chief executive Peter Georgiopoulos and dry
bulk specialist Jinhui Shipping & Transportation vice-president Raymond Ching who
both doubted the suitability and safety of the converted VLOC 20 , they think there are
still insufficient successful examples to prove that those vessels’ safety. Once those
vessels have accident in the sea, it will damage the environment around especially due
to those vessels are mainly very large vessels and then make the shipowner face huge
amount claim. The author think this point has its sense, only due to vessels like Hebei
Ocean shipping’s converted VLOC operate 10 voyages safety, it still can not make
sure that other converted vessels also don’t have problems especially in a
circumstance that shipyards have so many works which means they have to hurry up
to finish more and has possibility to made the vessels not reach the quality they
should be. The possible solution may be like shipowners should choose shipyard
carefully, like those has a good reputation and try to scrutiny the vessel carefully
when shipyard delivers it.

The third risk those shipowners have to consider is the threat of growing operating
cost (high crew cost) and fuel cost. Figure 4.2 shows the bunker price both in short
term and long term, from this figure we can see that the owner bear a greater burden
of operate vessels than 10 years before as fuel cost already tripled. It doesn’t like
19
20

Dry bulk forecaster 08.1q
Genmar fears on VLCC conversions, author: Michelle Wiese Bockmann, 2007 Dec 13th
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freight market, which fluctuates so many times during those years, the fuel market is
growing every year and no one knew where the peak point is. As the result, it seems
high operating expenses and rising bunker cost will be a constant worry especially for
short voyage. Once the market is not strong enough, operating cost may easily eat the
daily income especially in a high bunker price age. For example, Teekay Corportation
and Overseas Shipholding Group just announced their net income in 2007 down about
25% compare to there planning at the beginning of 2007 due to operating cost sharp
hike around 38% and tanker market is not grow as they wish.

Figure 4.2 Bunker prices in short and long term

(Source: shipping sector report 2007 autumn)

As the author mentioned in chapter3, nowadays, the bulk freight is higher than the
tanker freight when the vessel’s DWT are the same, so the rising oil price has and will
affect tanker market more drastically than dry bulk market in the next one year. On
2007 march, a VLCC’s bunker cost represents 34% of freight income ($62193/day)
and a Capesize bulk carrier’s bunker cost account only 9% of freight income
($37045/day). By August it represents 60% of freight income ($47993/day) and 10 %
($93466/day) respectively. From this we can see that increasing bunker cost impact
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tanker more than dry bulk carrier currently. So once the owners decide to update the
single hull tanker, they should consider more about how to compensate the bunker
price. Not only bulk carrier has better ability to bear the bunker cost, from table 4.2
we can also see that both Suezmax and VLCC tankers consume more bunker than dry
bulk carrier in same deadweight. This feature made very large bulk vessel owner has
an even better ability to bear the fuel cost compare to very large tanker owner
nowadays. But remember the future of dry bulk market seems not as attractive as
tanker market, it looks like at first tanker owner will have a tough time and then dry
bulk owner will worry about how to cover their cost, so both methods have its
advantage and disadvantage.

The possible solution for Z Company is adding a bunker adjustment clause in contract
to compensate the increasing bunker price. Some shipowners like Zodiac already
using this kind of clause long time ago. The drawback of this solution is due to the
potential imbalance capacity between supply and demand of both tanker and dry bulk
carrier then there is a possibility that charterers refuse this kind of clause since too
many vessels open in market and the owner has to take it as their own cost.

The last risk the shipowners may face is the time lag between begin covert or update a
vessel and shipyard finally delivers the vessel. This is more important of day bulk
carrier owners due to different future of dry bulk market and tanker market. Since in
2009 huge amount of new capacity will go to the market, the owner have to consider
when they finally get the vessel, the golden age of dry bulk has already gone. Tanker
market seems has a better situation when the single hull tanker out of market after
2010, shipowners will glad to get the vessel around that time instead of take it right
now for avoid the bad time. As the result, those shipowners who want to convert
single hull tanker into dry bulk carrier have to consider two aspects: the first is if there
are enough building berth to convert the ship, as currently there are so many
newbuilding orders to shipyards, many shipyards already didn’t have any spare
capacity to convert vessel until 2011; second problem is due to booming ship building
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market, direct result is ship equipments market in a shortage condition. So when
shipowners can really begin the conversion process not only depend on the
availability of shipyard berth but also if the shipowner has to wait equipments, like
hatch. Nowadays, time lag between order 2 hatches and shipowner finally get this two
hatches takes more thane 15 months, in another word, once shipowner decide convert
a VLCC to VLOC and they can’t get hatches or other required equipment immediately,
it will takes at least 15 months. The direct result is when the shipowner finally gets
the VLOC, the market may already fall and the shipowner can’t find any offer as they
wish.

The Possible solution is sign long-term affreightment contract before convert a VLCC
into VLOC. Like Zodiac that first sign 10 years COA with WuHan steel factory and
then converted two VLCCs into VLOCs. COSCO Hong Kong also has this kind of
contract with Bao steel. For Z Company, as it is a national owned company and has
very good relation with other national owned factory, they can also follow COSCO’s
way that first try to persuade other local companies to use Z Company’s vessel as
their carrier to transfer their cargo and then convert the vessel.

4.4 Economic effect of different methods

By use what has been done in chapter 3, here we can deduct the economic result of
those strategies and make the recommendation. Due to the limit of information the
author got, update or convert cost of some vessels are unpublished. As the author has
compared the cost of updates and converts a VLCC and the two total cost are almost
the same, the author assume the cost of update and convert a same deadweight tanker
is the same. In above paragraph, the author mentioned some shipping companies have
signed the long time charterparty before they order a new vessel. This method of
course can grant the shipping company has a stable income but it also made the owner
can’t gain a lot because in shipping market the longer the contract the lower the rate.
Consider Z Company didn’t have a very close relationship with the national steel
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factories or traders, the author believe this is not a very useful way for them right now.
In the calculation below, the author will take one-year timecharter rate to calculate the
potential benefit.

Total cost of convert or update a single hull tanker: 20 millions + 170*50000(Z
Company’s VLCC is older than 10 years and assume the ship operate 340 days per
year) =129.1 millions

The

future

5

years

of

double

hull

tanker

income

is

=

income

is

=

(68040+64290+66520+68860+71260)*340 =115.25 millions

The

future

5

years

of

dry

bulk

carrier

(136460+91880+77000+70000+60000)*340= 148 millions.

The operating cost of VLCC and Capesize is increasing since 1999. From the table
below we can that the percentage of increasing is almost the same.

Table 4.2 Operating cost from 1999 to 2008
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

VLCC
7420
7295
7320
7395
7650
8130
8740
9445
9900
10310

VLOC
-1.7%
0.3%
1.0%
3.4%
6.3%
7.5%
8.1%
4.8%
4.1%

5200
5516
5881
6406
6712
6996

6.08%
6.62%
8.93%
4.78%
4.23%
(Data source: Drewry)

So the difference of operating cost between VLCC and VLOC should be
(10310-6996)*340=1.1 million USD. The total difference in 5 years should be 5.9
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millions based on every year the increasing operating percentage is 4%.

Bunker cost also should be considered especially in an age of high oil price (see table
4.3, it calculate the average bunker price among Arabian Gulf, North Europe,
Mediterranean, US Gulf, Caribbean and Singapore). From table 4.4, we can find that
tanker consume more oil when the deadweight is the same. The difference should
540*(86.8-73.7)*340=2.4 millions USD.

Table 4.3 Bunker price from 2003 to 2007
Average
2003
171.7
2004
183.2
2005
273.8
2006
325.8
2007
384
To date 2008
494
18-Apr
540

Change
6.7%
49.5%
19.0%
17.9%
28.6%
9.3%
(Data source: Drewry)

Table 4.4 Bunker cost and speed knots
Tanker

Bulk
Speed

Speed

t/day

t/day
knots

knots
160000-199999

15.1

70.5

200000-254999

14.4

55.7

14.2

64.4

255000-319999

15.6

86.8

13.4

73.7

320000+

16.2

114.2

15

87.1
(Data source: Clarkson)

So consider freight income, operating cost and bunker cost, the convert method can
make the single hull VLCC owner gain around 30 millions USD than update method.
It seems convert method is much better than update method, but two things should be
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noted, first, the trend is different as in dry bulk market the freight is decrease while in
tanker market is opposite; second, not only Australia, Brazil forbid overage (25 years)
bulker access their ports but also in 2008 May India government issue a policy that
forbid overage vessels. Those restrictions made the converted VLCC actually can
only use about 5 to 6 years (consider most candidates VLCC of conversion are built
around 1988 to 1992, and the earliest time the owner can get the vessel is 2009) that is
about 5 years less than the update VLCC. So the author think update VLCC has more
potential to gain a better retune of investment.

4.5 Other strategies in China

Just as the author mentioned in chapter 3, there are not much cases that adopted the
other three strategies especially in China. Even the owners want to use those three
methods they have to consider the domestic rule. This paragraph will discuss the
Chinese rules relate to those three methods.

FPSO can not only transfer oil but also product and storage oil, the later two functions
are subject to government control that made entrance level of having a FPSO is very
high. Currently, CNOOC is the only company in China that owns FPSO type vessel.
Those FPSOs are distributed in the BoHai Sea and the South China Sea. The tonnage
is from 50000 tonnages to 250000 tonnages and totals deadweight over 1.7 million
tons, and those vessels have been operating in depth water ranges from over 10m to
330m (Fan Mo, 2008). Since in China it is very unlikely the government will allow
another company to have FPSO that made convert VLCC into FPSO work very
unpopular in China. Even those Chinese single hull tanker owners want to convert a
single hull tanker into FPSO, they have to first have the permission from Chinese
government which means they have to do a lot of relationship work, otherwise they
can only sell it to CNOOC or other foreigner buyers. According to the law of supply
and demand we can easily notice that in China FPSO market is almost total buyer’s
market that means the price will not very good. Also as the author mentioned in
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chapter3, the huge initial input is a problem that covert a VLCC into FPSO is more
than 4 times expensive than convert VLCC into VLOC.

Scrap market is not much more difference between domestic market and international
market in a hot freight market. As mentioned in chapter 3, there are extremely few
vessels scraped those years, so even the scrap steel price will still increasing due to
the new iron and ore agreement the author still don’t suggest shipowner adopt this
method unless they really need cash flow or the vessel is operating more than 20 years.
Since majority of Z Company’s VLCC tankers build around 1992, which mean
secondhand market still can offer a higher than demolish.

The only way shipowner can operate single hull tanker after IMO’s deadline is finding
a flag state and port state which willing to allow operate single hull tanker in domestic
area. In 2003 Chinese government already suspend all secondhand tanker import
activity and didn’t allow it operate in domestic area. In 2007, Chinese communication
department issued [2007] 394 orders, which suspend all new secondhand tanker
capacity operate in Yangtze River. From this we can find the Chinese government’s
attitude, there is relative little chance that shipowners can operate single hull tanker in
domestic area after IMO’s deadline. The deep of water is also a problem as in China
that seldom river can accommodate a VLCC type vessel.

4.6 Recommendations

After above analysis , we can see that Z Company, which currently has 3 VLCCs
build around 1990, should only consider to adopt two solutions: convert single hull
tanker into dry bulk carrier and update it into double hull tanker due for other
solutions either has economic disadvantage or not in their core business. The remains
two methods both have advantages and disadvantages: conversion method can quickly
get the investment back while the update method can get more return. So which
method to choose is depends on the condition of Z Company.
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As the author mentioned above Z Company has good reputation in both tanker market
and dry bulk market especially in tanker market. Since every company should
enhance its competitive side that means it is a great opportunity for Z Company to
expand their fleet and enhance its position in Chinese tanker industry in a
circumstance of Chinese new national oil policy which actually set a barrier to foreign
tanker companies. Due to the high price of both newbuilding tanker and secondhand
one, how to solve the capital problem and time difference is the first thing Z Company
has to faces when they want to quickly expand their fleet. For capital aspect, Z
Company can get investment through issue stock, for time aspect, just buy the
secondhand vessel is not only cost a lot but also may not design as they wish. So fully
utilize single hull tankers they already have means a lot to them for above two
aspects.

Due to Z Company not only have tankers but also bulkers, convert VLCC into VLOC
is an alternative for them to spread risk. But the author didn’t think this method will
bring more to Z Company when compare update method for three reasons: firstly,
there will be huge amount new vessel hit the water after mid 2009 which has high
possibility to turn the bulk market up side down; secondly, due to the iron ore market
is so irrational in China that made Chinese government may take some political
methods to control the market and let it cooler especially when consider historical
amount supply backing up at main Chinese ports; thirdly, Z Company’s competitive
strength is not in dry bulk side. The author always believes once a company want to
build its brand, it must has its core business and this is why the author believe unless
Z Company doesn’t want to be number one in Chinese tanker market, they should not
put much resources in other places.

From the above generalize analysis, we can then deduct the following more specific
advantage and disadvantage for Z Company to covert VLCC into VLOC.
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1.

The average freight rate of dry bulk fleet in the next 5 years still predicted to be
higher than the rate of tanker then this will made financial burden of Z Company can
be quickly released. This is the main reason why Z Company can consider convert a
VLCC into VLOC.

2.

It is still not definite that the future of tanker market will be as good as those
tanker owner hopes due to the new capacity in tanker market is very huge. This made
convert a VLCC can help Z Company to spread the risk and made them have more
ability to bear the potential fluctuation of tanker market. This is another reason why
the author thinks Z Company can convert a VLCC into VLOC.

3.

The main reason the author didn’t recommend Z Company to convert more VLOC
is their strength is in tanker market and they only has some small dry bulk carriers
which means they are lack of experience of operating VLOC especially in human
resources aspect. Currently in a high daily hire age, experience operator may make the
vessel save 1 or 2 days, which may means more than 400 thousands USD, compare to
the fresh one when the vessel meet some accident or unexpected situations. Also the
owner must notice that very high market level doesn’t mean an attractive income
especially in cape market, which has less competition than the other markets. In this
year the hire rate of capsize bulker increasing a lot due to Rio Tinto and BHPB, two
Australia big iron and ore exporters, always charted in more than 10 vessels in one
day that means there are insufficient or even none vessel open in the market for a
while and then lead the BDI increasing a lot. Further result is market climb so high
then currently Chinese traders or factories buy iron and ore in domestic market is even
cheaper than buy it in Australia plus transport rate, and this made them stop import
any more unless they have COA contract to perform. Everybody knows transportation
is a derivative of trade, once there is no trade there is no transportation. So maybe the
market will just look good and can’t bring fortune to Z Company.

4.

Chinese government issues the policy to encourage national tanker fleet transfer
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the oil which made state owned tanker companies have more bargain power when
negotiate the freight. Meanwhile, China iron and ore association attack Rio Tinto, one
of China’s biggest ore suppliers, was intentionally diverting ore to the higher-price
spot market in May (Chinica market report 2008-5-15). The direct result is record iron
ore stock in China ports which made all the main ports in China face serious
congestion problem. And this is something Chinese government doesn’t want to see,
they arise warehouse fees almost four times in June that may made the Chinese import
amount decrease and persuade Vale to stop export iron and ore to China for 1 to 2
months, whether this will infect the future of import in China is still unclear. But
consider the huge amount of new vessels hit the water, once China’s needs for
demand for iron and ore slows down due to large stock amount in ports, then bulk
freight will plummet instead of just decline.

5.

Currently, there are only 10 to 12 specialized iron and ore ports in the world,
among them only 3 to 4 can accommodate VLOC, which beam wide than 58m. It not
only indicate that if lots converted VLOCs operating in the market, it will make those
ports extremely crowded but also once those VLOCs can’t access Australia and Brazil,
it seems those vessels have little alternative options.

6.

Since there are huge amount of newbuilding VLOC that can load more cargo than
converted VLOC when the deadweight is the same due tot the strength of hull
between original bulker and converted bulker is not the same. So when the market
goes down it will make the converted VLOC has less competitiveness and the result is
those vessels can only get the below average freight.

So the author think Z Company should update at least 2 or all single hull VLCCs into
double hull that not only can enhance its tanker capacity but also can gain a lot with
less risk. Once Z Company make their decision about how deal with single hull
tankers they have, they should not only consider which shipyard they make their
updating work but also should try to do those businesses (maybe their own maybe
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they can try to take other companies which also interest in update their own tankers)
together for a better price especially when they can buy steel itself and then provide it
to shipyard for a cost reduction.

After they get the vessel they still should remember Chinese tanker fleet is still
relatively small, Rome was not built in one day, so they should always remember to
establish a strategy alliance which may help them to enhance their bargain power with
foreign oil suppliers. Also they should consider divide their fleet into two parts, one
operate in spot market and the other for time charter. This can effectively avoid the
market risk, for shipowner can both gain a predictable fixed income and don’t miss
the opportunity when market goes up. When the market is attractive enough to Z
Company, they can also fix the near future income by long time charter all the vessels
they have.

So update majority of their single hull tanker into double one in a good shipyard and
running them in both spot and period markets are the recommendation the author
made to Z Company.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

Shipping market is changing every day and that lead the attitude towards single hull
tankers is also changing every day, which will raise fascinating possibilities. One
thing seems quite certain is lots of single hull tankers especially VLCC will leave the
market for either update or convert from 2008 to 2010. Although there are some
potential risks, the author still believes after 2010 there will be a new era of tanker.

The conversion work made drastically impact on both tanker and dry bulk markets in
supply profile of the fleet. Although lots of pioneers already did the conversion or
updating work, there are still plenty of investors hesitating to make their choices. The
author believes that actually projects made will depends on both the availability of
shipyard capacity, in another word, whether there are spare berth, and developments
in tanker market and dry bulk market.

No matter how uncertain the environment is, how to deal with huge amount of single
hull tankers is a question Chinese tanker companies can’t avoid. As currently shipping
market is still strong, the sooner those companies make the decision the higher profit
they may gain due to the time difference between the owner make their decisions and
actually they can use the vessel. Those shipowner should also consider the deadline of
operating single hull tanker, once it pass the deadline the shipowner can only put the
vessel in shipyard for conversion or demolish and maybe not only wait a long time
but also have to suffer weak market. Most important, as a Chinese tanker company,
how to fully utilize the develop opportunity of China to expand the scale and increase
its share in shipping market is the key for their future since those companies have
advantages in both location and relationship with government and cargo owner when
compare with international companies.

Although there are so many values the single hull tankers still have, we cannot
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overlook the potential risk. First of all is whether the converted or updated vessel is
safe enough since their original design structures has huge difference. Second, the
surge in oil and iron ore price is very likely to depress growth in the global economy
and then lead to inflation. In the beginning of 2008, the stock amount of iron ore in
Chinese main ports never less than 60 millions tonnes, this lead Chinese government
issued a policy to slow down the unreasonable iron and ore import. No body knows
what is the effect of this policy and once China decide to lower its iron ore import
amount ,it will made the winter of dry bulk market comes earlier than people predict.
On June 6th, BCI just surfer the sharpest fall in history (decrease 2855 point from
18033 to 15178), which seems a signal that the market has lack of energy to continue
going up. Third, in tanker market, high oil price already made the supply of oil in
Chinese market is insufficient that made people have to wait long time then can fulfill
their cars, this is also a signal that oil company already feel burden to import oil,
always remember trade is the foundation of transportation. So the author believes
every Chinese company which involved to faces single hull tanker problem has to
consider how to respond when the market goes down.

Nobody knows exactly of the future, the author hopes this dissertation may help
somebody who is trying to know something about how to deal with single hull tanker.
After all which methods will be choose is depends on the company actual condition
and what’s they feel about market. Convert market seems have more risk than
updating method when consider most companies which own VLCC are good at tanker
market, also dry bulk market is more fluctuate than tanker market (can seen chapter 3
which shows the change of freight rate in tanker market and bulker market) and tanker
structure is more suitable for update into same type of vessel than convert into a total
different design pattern one. But every coin has two sides, by taking higher risk, it
also come along with more possibility to gain a high profit. So which methods to be
chosen finally will depends on their feeling about the market and their ability to bear
the potential loss. But the author heartily hope those Chinese tanker company can
have a competitive tanker fleet to take the burden of secure China has enough oil to
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use.

Since both tanker and dry bulk markets are very huge and complex which influenced
by many factors, this dissertation can only give a general instruction and definitely
has a lot of drawbacks. Due to a lot of cost information is confidential, the author only
analyzes VLCC type of tanker and this is a regret of this paper. Also as this limitation
of ship building experience this dissertation didn’t involved a lot with the conversion
or updating technique, the author focus on the economic aspect then made this
dissertation not cover other aspects.
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